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Abstract: In the context of the motor skill literature on observational
learning and hierarchical skill structuring, Byrne & Russon’s findings call
into question their standpoint that great apes imitate the behaviour of role
models at the programme level. The authors impose a hierarchical model
on their observations without properly considering alternative explana-
tions. One such possibility, which stems from a constraints perspective that
they dismiss, is put forward.
Our major concern with Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s) target article
is their a priori acceptance of a single model – a hierarchical skill
model – as a framework for their observations. Their only justifi-
cation seems to be that the organisation of the behaviour observed
is “simply not well described as linear and chain-like” (sect. 2.2,
para. 10). They dismiss potential alternatives in a rather cavalier
fashion, stating, for example, that “it is highly implausible, how-
ever, that the constraints of the environment would be so tight that
every animal would end up with the same hierarchical structure,
yet so weak that the fine details of the techniques are highly vari-
able between individuals” (sect. 2.4, para. 2). Our critique will fo-
cus first on the hierarchical model; then we will argue that B&R’s
dismissal of explanations based on the concept of constraints was
rather premature.
Hierarchical modeling. The fact that we, as external observers,
can describe and deconstruct behaviour into hierarchical units is
no guarantee that the actor organised its behaviour hierarchically
or that the behaviour was learned in a hierarchical fashion. Given
that the motor skill literature has much to say about the hierar-
chical structuring of behaviour, also in the context of observational
learning, it is surprising that B&R do not at least make reference
to it. In this literature the origin of such structuring is often viewed
in a similar way, that is, it is assumed that the lower levels of the
hierarchy are established first and serve as the basis for integra-
tion at superordinate levels. This proposed order of establishment
of such levels has been called into question, however, in at least
two studies (Kohl & Shea 1992; Pew 1966). In a replication of
Pew’s earlier experimental laboratory work, Kohl and Shea for ex-
ample, coupled observers to novice subjects required to learn a
cursor matching task. Their findings led them to conclude that a
“first-person direct perspective on sensory feedback and knowl-
edge of results was not critical for attaining open-loop and hierar-
chical control” (p. 257). Kohl and Shea claim that their data 
support the notion that subjects may choose appropriate re-
sponse/control schemes without actual practical experience, a
standpoint that was suggested earlier by Martens et al. (1976). If
this is the case, their findings might easily be subsumed under
what B&R call “priming” rather than imitation. A similar inter-
pretation might then also account for the feeding behaviour of
baby gorillas. After all, the babies, throughout their developmen-
tal period, are confronted daily with the same expert model
demonstrating appropriate response/control schemes. Having
been primed in this way, they are free to experiment – at least
within the bounds of the prevailing constraints.
Alternative explanations. In view of this critique of B&R’s in-
terpretation of the data, we will now present an alternative inter-
pretation, arguing that the concept of constraints is much more
powerful than B&R admit. A constraint on action is defined as any
reduction in the range of possible configurations of the movement
system. B&R mention environmental constraints only, but con-
straints can also originate from the task and from the animal (cf.
Newell 1986). Constraints relevant to mountain gorillas, for ex-
ample, are physiological characteristics of the teeth and gut that
constrain the choice of food; biomechanical characteristics such as
uni- and bi-manual dexterity and characteristics of specific food
that constrain food manipulation such as spines and stings; infor-
mation available from models pointing out alternative behavioural
possibilities; and ambient conditions such as season, time of day,
gravity, and so forth. From this perspective, models serve mainly
as social facilitation. They can increase the likelihood of certain be-
haviours, but they do not prescribe behaviour. In other words, they
act as informational constraints influencing what to do, but not
how to do it. The latter needs to be filled in by individual experi-
ence.
The interactions between all extant constraints determine the
possible patterns of coordination and control for an organism en-
gaged in an activity. Note, however, that the confluence of con-
straints does not necessarily limit the actor to a single solution to
a task, as B&R seem to suggest. Rather, by making certain behav-
iours impossible while influencing the efficiency and optimality of
others, interactions between constraints determine both the range
of possible solutions and the likelihood of each solution. Further-
more, constraints act more severely on behaviour at a global scale
of description than on the details at a local scale of description,
which are left relatively free. In short, the probability distribution
ensures that the behaviour of all animals is channelled toward only
a few solutions; within each of these solutions, behaviour across
different animals will cohere globally but differ locally.
Both these characteristics are consistent with the data B&R re-
port (i.e., 70–80% of the apes converge to the same global solu-
tion of preparing food), although local details vary widely between
individual animals. The 20–30% discrepancy is consistent with a
constraints perspective, but seems inexplicable from an imitation
standpoint.
What is needed to test either explanation is an analysis of the
learning process in young apes. Unfortunately, B&R do not report
any data on the learning process per se. They have analysed the
product of social learning in terms of a hierarchical structure of
goals and subgoals, but it is at the level of the learning process
where support is to be found for either a hierarchical or a con-
straints model. However, even with adult data, critical questions
arise. If separate, noninteracting groups of mountain gorillas have
the same feeding techniques, for example, would this not support
the constraints model?
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Abstract: We outline a view of imitative behaviour as largely internally 
driven and discuss, based on experimental research, the distinction be-
tween program versus action level imitation, the role of organismic con-
straints, observational learning as vicarious exploration, and imitation as
selection in speeded response paradigms.
If one compares the movement imitated with its imitation, it is the in-
tegrated movement-melody of each which stands forth as being the
common element; a photographic reproduction of the separate move-
ments involved is never found. (Koffka, 1935, p. 308 f.)
Imitative behaviour has all too often invited the equivalent of a
naive realist interpretation of perception, in the sense that an ex-
act copy of the model behaviour is expected. Like perception,
however, imitation always points to the cognitive capabilities of the
imitator as well as to the model. Thus, Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s)
anchoring of their analysis of primate imitative behaviour in the
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capacity for flexible, hierarchical action planning is a sensible
starting point for clarifying the contrasting views in current pri-
mate research. In addition to hierarchical organization, the mod-
ularity and selectivity of sensory and motor processes have be-
come major themes in neuroscience, and to capture the richness
of imitative behaviour, these phenomena, too, require considera-
tion. Also, more microanalytic (e.g., kinematic and chronometric)
approaches have come to prevail over pure observational meth-
ods, and a major goal of current imitation research is to elucidate
the interactions between the multiple sensory, representational,
and motor preparatory processes involved in imitating even such
simple actions as pointing to or grasping a glass of beer. Examples
from our research relate specifically to points made in the target
article and illustrate this approach.
Action level imitation? A close match in kinematic details be-
tween mimic and model may rely as much on structural organiza-
tion as higher (or “program”) level imitation does. Human subjects
were asked to reproduce accurately a sequence of smooth lateral
deviations of a cursor on a monitor (Vogt 1991; Whiting et al.
1992) – an apparently prototypical case for “action-level” imita-
tion. Instead of producing stereotyped sequences of increasing
length, however, subjects initially reproduced a small number of
global characteristics of the cursor movement (such as its center-
ing around a midpoint and an alternation of right- and leftward
movements) before any fixed sequence emerged. Thus, even sim-
ple pattern learning appears to involve the extraction of complex
features rather than the formation of linear associations. Primates
are simply too clever to act as videorecorders. Accordingly, rather
than contrasting program- and action-level imitation as distinct
faculties, we interpret the (limited) capacity of human primates
for near-exact copying as a consequence of their increased cogni-
tive abilities, including a specific, quantitatively and temporally
enhanced capacity to recognize and respond to the mimic and ges-
tural behaviour of their conspecifics.
Organismic constraints. Near-exact copying may in some situ-
ations rely on shared organismic constraints between model and
imitator rather than on sensory processing. Even after more than
100 reproductions of an artificially composed rhythmic pattern,
subjects systematically deviated from its isochronic temporal
structure, whereas their reproductions of a more natural, non-
isochronic pattern were nearly perfect (Vogt et al. 1988). Thus,
the use of artificial models (e.g., video animations) can help un-
cover apparently imitative behaviour resulting from shared motor
control principles.
Observational learning as vicarious exploration. Like B&R,
we were originally skeptical about observational learning as an aid
to motor skill acquisition, particularly when an exploration of the
medium of a skill (such as the mechanical properties of a racket)
is required, but a recent experiment (Vogt 1996a) has made us
more optimistic. The task involved a biphasic movement of the
pivot of a pendulum along a linear track, and mastery of this task
required precise (procedural) knowledge of the pendulum’s iner-
tia and swing duration. To our surprise, a group that observed a
skilled model for 60 trials showed improvements similar to that of
a physical practice group. Two principles may explain this ex-
ploratory effect of observational learning: internal pattern (or
event) generation and gradual correction. Observing a model need
not be limited to the “imprinting” of a perceptual template, as of-
ten assumed; it may well involve processes of internal pattern gen-
eration, thus functioning as an externally guided form of motor im-
agery (Jeannerod 1994; Vogt 1994; 1995; 1996a; 1996b). Unlike in
motor imagery, however, observers can detect divergences be-
tween their internal plan and the model, which can be used for
gradual corrections, either immediately or when preparing the
next (overt or covert) performance. Meltzoff and Moore (1994;
1997) stress that infants’ imitations are seldom perfect from the
start; moreover, infants gradually correct their imitative attempts
in a sequence of ordered steps. Adult imitation may involve an in-
ternalization of this process and thus act as a shortcut in exploring
task constraints.
Imitation as selection. For analysing the processing stages and
neural pathways involved in a particular imitative behaviour, it is
useful to identify the earliest indication of a specific response to
the model behaviour under various display conditions. We are cur-
rently investigating the imitation of simple object-oriented hand
actions. Data from one pilot study indicate that kinematic re-
sponses to shifts in the direction of a model’s hand grasping one of
three objects are as fast as responses to shifts of the target object’s
location (see Paulignan et al. 1991). Note that in such speeded re-
sponse tasks the model display is mainly used as a way to select
one of a (normally small) set of possible actions. Whereas B&R
prefer to exclude such selective, instantly model-guided behav-
iour from imitative phenomena, we see no reason to do so a pri-
ori. To conceptualize imitation as selection in such tasks seems to
imply a very small number of visually addressable dimensions of
control. Accordingly, this view would become increasingly unten-
able if imitation extended beyond the instructed task dimension
(location in our study) and incorporated other task dimensions
such as grip aperture or speed and height of transport. Exactly
such instant multi-dimensional visual addressing of motor control
seems to be largely absent in speeded imitation tasks, and subjects’
copying is reduced to the essential.
In summary, the enormous flexibility of unconstrained primate
imitative behaviour appears to emerge from a variety of individu-
ally addressable visuomotor channels, or modules, which most
likely involve a complex network of parietal, temporal, and frontal
cortical areas (Carey et al., 1997). A detailed investigation of this
neural substrate requires a suitable “taxonomy” of imitative be-
haviour based on experimental research, in which the hierarchical
level of imitation represents only one of a possibly large number
of relevant dimensions.
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Abstract: Byrne & Russon suggest that the production of action by pri-
mates is hierarchically organised. We assess the evidence for hierarchical
structure in the comprehension of action by primates. Focusing on work
with human children we evaluate several possible indices of program-level
comprehension.
Byrne & Russon (B&R) argue that apes, like human children, are
capable of program-level imitation. This type of imitation involves
an appreciation of the way in which the hierarchical organisation
of the model’s action realises its goal. We expand on an important
implication of their argument.
Following the arguments advanced by Miller et al. (1960), we
assume that human beings engage in hierarchically organised,
planned action. These arguments are likely to extend to the great
apes. The more contentious issue, in our eyes, is whether young
primates can perceive and comprehend the hierarchical structure
in the planned activities of an adult so as to reproduce it when they
themselves act. In this commentary, we assess evidence for such
program-level comprehension. We focus primarily on research
with human children.
Weak indices. One criterion for attributing program-level com-
prehension is the tendency to omit those details of an observed ac-
tion that serve no functional purpose. However, the evidence for
such a tendency among young children is questionable. Young
children have often been found to persist in replicating such de-
tails, even when their nonfunctionality has been made clear
(Whiten et al. 1996). Furthermore, this criterion may sometimes
yield false negatives, in that there may be some utility to copying
all the details of demonstrations, either because they are not fully
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